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Response to Keeping Cases from Black 
Juries: An Empirical Analysis of How 
Race, Income Inequality, and Regional 
History Affect Tort Law 
Jennifer Wriggins* 
Abstract 
Issues of race and racism in the U.S. torts system continue to 
deserve much more attention from legal scholarship than they 
receive, and Keeping Cases from Black Juries is a valuable 
contribution. Studying racism as it infects the torts system is 
difficult because explicit de jure exclusions of black jurors are in 
the past; race is no longer on the surface of tort opinions; and 
court records do not reveal the race of tort plaintiffs, defendants, 
or jurors. Yet it is essential to try and understand the workings of 
race and racism in the torts system. The authors pose a question 
that is probably impossible to definitively answer but that is very 
important to explore: where state legislatures and courts continue 
to retain outmoded tort doctrines like contributory negligence, 
which tend to limit plaintiffs’ access to juries, is this because state 
legislatures and judges believe juries with large concentrations of 
African-Americans and low-income people will unacceptably 
distribute wealth to plaintiffs? The term “Bronx effect” alludes to 
this alleged phenomenon. No other article has rigorously tried to 
link the so-called Bronx effect with the perpetuation of outmoded 
tort doctrines. The authors use a complex interdisciplinary 
approach to rank states in terms of the degree to which their tort 
doctrines deny plaintiffs’ access to juries. Digging deep into factors 
that might affect a state’s ranking, they then find strong 
correlations between a state’s law making it difficult for plaintiffs 
to reach a jury, and a state’s having a large African-American 
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population and/or being part of the South. This and other 
findings in the article are significant, bringing to light a race-
based exclusionary pattern in the legal system. The pattern of 
keeping cases from black buries also likely leads to 
undercompensation of African-American plaintiffs, my response 
explains. The article deserves a place in torts scholarship 
generally, in critical race scholarship, and in empirical legal 
scholarship. While it is not surprising that definitive causal 
conclusions are lacking, implicit bias may shed light on the 
mechanisms by which these outmoded doctrines endure. The 
article’s calls for reform are reasonable in light of the evidence of 
the study and other torts scholarship.  
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I. Introduction 
Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An Empirical Analysis of 
How Race, Income Inequality and Regional History Affect Tort 
Law,1 by Donald G. Gifford and Brian Jones, is one of a small 
number of works that explore torts, race, and racism.2 Racism 
                                                                                                     
 1.  73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016).  
 2.  For other works discussing this nexus of issues, see generally MARTHA 
CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND 
TORT LAW (2010); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching 
for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761 (1996); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, 
Race, and the Value of Injury 1900-1949, 49 HOW. L. J. 99 (2005) [hereinafter 
Wriggins, Torts and Race]; Jennifer B. Wriggins, Constitution Day Lecture: 
Constitutional Law and Tort Law: Injury, Race, Gender, and Equal Protection, 
63 ME. L. REV. 263 (2010) [hereinafter Wriggins, Constitutional Law].  
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(blatant and subtle) in the U.S. remains a scourge despite all the 
progress that has been made. The torts system is the premier 
mechanism of compensation for personal injuries in the U.S. and 
is an important part of all law schools’ educational programs. 
Studying any aspect of the torts system is methodologically 
challenging. Some of the challenges include that tort law doctrine 
varies from state to state, operates in a decentralized way, 
features many unreported judicial decisions, and operates with a 
large majority of cases settling without a public record of the 
settlement amount.3 Interdisciplinary, empirical approaches are 
indispensable in understanding how the torts system works. 
Studying racism as it affects and infuses the torts system is 
particularly difficult. Explicit de jure exclusions of black jurors 
are in the past and race4 is not on the surface of tort opinions any 
more.5 Further, court records now do not reveal the race of tort 
plaintiffs, defendants, or jurors, making it daunting for 
researchers to explore issues of tort liability or damages as they 
relate to race.6 Historically, there has not been much race-specific 
torts doctrine.7 Black plaintiffs have sued and won under the 
                                                                                                     
 3.  Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race 
and Remedies 1867-2007, 27 REV. OF LIT. 37, 38–39 (2007) [hereinafter Wriggins, 
Thoughts on Race and Remedies]. 
 4.  The Article and my response are not adding to the extensive legal 
literature on the social construction of and indeterminacy of race, see, e.g., Ian 
Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 1, 21 (1994) (discussing the 
argument that “race [is] but one component in the formation of ethnic groups”), 
but are looking at the ways race and perceptions of race may operate in the legal 
system and society. In these comments, I am using “African-American” and 
“black” interchangeably. Of course, there are many issues of race, ethnicity, and 
juries that neither these brief comments nor the Article deal with.  
 5.  See Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3, at 60–61 
(“New attention to race and damages, particularly from Emancipation to 1950, 
paints a complex picture showing that race and racism are not extrinsic to torts 
but are as surely a part of it as is industrial development.”).  
 6.  For example, researchers trying to determine how jury composition 
affects damages have to use census data that includes racial composition of 
populations to estimate racial composition of juries rather than actual jury 
composition. See Eric Hellan & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, & American 
Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 26, 52 (2003) 
(“[W]e do not have data on the composition of the jury, and we must therefore 
infer jury characteristics from county characteristics.”).  
 7.  See Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 105 n.26 (“I believe 
many structural factors, such as the all-white legal system, probably made it 
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torts system since the end of slavery, though the damages they 
have won have not been commensurate with the damages won by 
whites in many instances.8 The use of explicitly race-based data 
in tort litigation for determining damages, long attacked by 
scholars, has been held unconstitutional on several occasions.9 
Yet, race matters in torts as in the rest of the U.S. legal system.10 
Given the current situation where race is no longer on the surface 
of judicial opinions, new approaches are needed to gain traction 
for understanding race and torts on the ground now. In this 
response, I will describe the authors’ approach, the significance of 
their project, its place in the legal literature, and the meaning of 
their findings.  
II. The Approach 
The authors develop an interdisciplinary approach to 
exploring the questions they pose. Their hypothesis is  
that judges and state legislators often believe that juries with 
a substantial percentage of African-American or low-income 
jurors are more inclined to find for personal injury victims and 
award higher damages and that these perceptions have led 
them to adopt rules making it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
have their cases decided by juries.11  
Of necessity, this hypothesis has several steps and 
interlocking aspects. The authors begin by describing the 
assumption, held by many vocal critics of the torts system, that 
predominately African-American and poor urban juries 
redistribute wealth in tort cases to plaintiffs by ruling against 
defendants who should not be held liable given the evidence, and 
by awarding plaintiffs inordinately high damage awards.12 
                                                                                                     
more difficult for black plaintiffs to win on liability, but clear doctrinal rules 
were not discernible.”).  
 8. See generally id. (discussing damages statistics across racial lines); 
Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3 (same). 
 9.  G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 92 F. Supp. 3d. 53, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); McMillan v. 
City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 10.  See Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3, at60–61 
(discussing the historical importance of race in torts cases).  
 11.  Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 561.  
 12.  See id. at 559 (“The image of the disproportionately African-American 
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Second, they turn to describe tort doctrines, enduring in some 
states, that would seem to keep plaintiffs’ cases from getting to a 
jury by resulting in defendants’ success in pretrial dismissal 
motions and in fewer plaintiffs’ cases being brought in the first 
place.13 An important example of this type of doctrine is 
traditional contributory negligence. This doctrine provides that if 
a plaintiff contributes even in small part to her injury, she is 
wholly barred from recovery. It has been abolished by court 
decision or statutes in all but a few states, but how do we know 
that these types of doctrines keep plaintiffs’ cases from getting to 
a jury? Looking at the all-or-nothing nature of the doctrine itself, 
it seems inevitable that the existence of the doctrine in a state 
would indeed result in more defendants’ success in pretrial 
dismissal motions and in fewer plaintiffs’ cases being filed at all. 
But proving that contributory negligence or other seemingly 
pro-defendant doctrines actually cause more dismissals or fewer 
cases to be brought is challenging to say the least. To respond to 
this challenge, the authors creatively developed a quantitative 
Jury Access Denial Index (JADI), which analyzed the tort 
doctrine in each state and the extent to which it prevented 
plaintiffs’ cases from getting to a jury.14 First, they looked at tort 
doctrines such as contributory negligence in the substantive law 
of each state.15 Recognizing that endurance of old-fashioned 
doctrines alone is not sufficient even to provide any estimate as to 
how much each doctrine contributes to failures of plaintiffs’ cases 
to reach a jury, they assembled a panel of twelve expert judges 
and practitioners to assess the relative significance of each of the 
doctrines in order to give each doctrine appropriate weight in the 
index.16 Then, using the law of seventeen states chosen for 
meeting certain criteria (such as whether it retained contributory 
negligence, geographic diversity and other factors)17, and the 
relative weight of the various doctrines as determined by the 
                                                                                                     
and poor urban jury redistributing wealth has dominated the political debate 
surrounding the tort system for the past generation.”). 
 13.  See id. at 571 (discussing “substantive legal principles that play 
important roles in dismissing tort cases”). 
 14.  See id. at 611–27 (providing the index and discussing its results). 
 15.  Id. at 614. 
 16.  Id. at 613.  
 17.  Id. at 614.  
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panel of experts, they assigned a Jury Access Denial Index (JADI) 
score to each of the seventeen states. At the end of this part of the 
analysis, the authors ranked each state in terms of the degree to 
which the state’s tort doctrines make a plaintiff’s access to a jury 
determination more difficult.18 
Does the first aspect, the assumption that predominately 
poor and urban African-American juries are “too” pro-plaintiff, 
relate in some causal fashion to the second aspect, the jury-
access-denying nature of a state’s substantive tort law? Even to 
articulate the question of this relationship shows both how 
difficult it is to resolve and how important this question and 
whole area of inquiry are.  
It is worth stepping back for a moment and considering some 
of the dimensions of the authors’ hypothesis that there is a link 
between jury denial and low-income and African-American 
populations (and thus jurors) and the implications if it is correct. 
First, doctrines and rules that deny plaintiffs’ access to jury trials 
will apply to all plaintiffs regardless of race (at least in theory). In 
addition, one important yet implicit aspect of this hypothesis has 
to do with the perceived race of the plaintiffs. Part of the 
perception that urban, predominately African-American juries 
are “out-of-control” stems from the notion that these juries are 
awarding “excessive” damages for the injuries of poor African-
Americans. This aspect of the perception is not made explicit but 
is a subtext. In the urban, predominately poor, largely African-
American areas from which these allegedly “out-of-control” juries 
are drawn it is likely that at least a significant fraction of the 
plaintiffs will be African-American.19 And these purportedly “out-
of-control” urban, predominately African-American juries are 
presumably awarding excessive damages to victims whose 
injuries do not “deserve” such compensation. Scholarship has 
traced the enduring “race-based discount” of the torts system 
applied to African-Americans’ injuries.20 Gifford and Jones do not 
                                                                                                     
 18.  Id. at 616. 
 19.  Contingency fee agreements provide a widespread funding mechanism 
for funding personal injury litigation. See Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 
2, at106–07.  
 20.  See, e.g., id. at 105, 138 (discussing cases treating black plaintiffs 
differently from white plaintiffs); Wriggins, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 
271 n.40 (describing “race-based discount”); Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and 
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directly focus on the “race-based discount,” but give additional 
resonance to the questions posed. If we consider this aspect more 
explicitly, we see that the broad questions posed by their Article 
are both about access to jury service for African-Americans in 
poor urban areas and, as important, access to tort remedies by 
African-Americans in these areas. Framed as such, this piece 
resonates with current activism concerning racial justice in the 
criminal justice system; for example, the Black Lives Matter 
movement.  
Returning to the hypothesis that the perception of overly 
redistributive urban poor African-American juries has led judges 
and legislators to restrict jury access, how does it fare in the 
actual analysis? The authors in Part IV, Table 1, include their 
JADI ranking of seventeen regionally disparate states which has 
five southern states (plus Texas) as the most jury-denying.21 This 
is very interesting, but not definitive (and not intended to be). 
The authors go on to review their multiple regression analysis of 
income inequality in a state’s major cities (with the widely used 
‘Gini’ coefficient measuring the degree of income inequality) to 
see if high income inequality in a state’s major cities correlates 
with a high JADI.22 They find there is some, but not statistically 
significant, correlation.23 They then explain that their analysis 
finds a statistically significant relationship between states where 
the largest cities include a higher percentage of African-American 
residents and a much higher JADI.24 As they note, “a higher 
percentage of African-Americans in the population is likely to 
have a large or substantial effect on JADI scores.”25 They also 
find an even stronger relationship between a state’s history as 
part of the South and a higher JADI score which is clearly 
statistically significant.26 Then they go on to note the complexity 
                                                                                                     
Remedies, supra note 3, at 37 (same).  
 21.  Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 616. 
 22.  See id. at 618 (“Publicity about “out-of-control juries” focuses on urban 
juries, not those in suburban and rural areas. In some states, a single city, such 
as Boston, dominates the images that judges and legislators have about urban 
juries.”). 
 23.  Id. at 619.  
 24. Id. at 620. 
 25. Id. at 620 n.279.  
 26. Id. at 621.  
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of the relationships between the variables, finding, for example, 
that even in northern cities a higher percentage of African-
Americans means a higher JADI.27 In their conclusion, the 
authors note that because racial biases are often unexpressed in 
the twenty-first century, they can only prove “strong correlations 
between a state’s substantive law that makes it difficult for 
personal injury plaintiffs to have their cases decided by a jury 
and the factors of race and being part of the south, and not 
causation.”28 However, they assert, “these strong correlations, 
particularly when coupled with the historical treatment of 
African-Americans, most egregiously in the South, suggest that 
these intertwined factors explain the continued observance of 
these doctrines discarded a generation ago by the overwhelming 
majority of other courts.”29 In other words, they are suggesting 
that the strong correlations combined with regional history do 
demonstrate causation. They go on to question the legitimacy of 
stare decisis in this context30 and to assert that the outmoded 
doctrines such as contributory negligence should be rejected as 
they are antiquated and “infused with the racial biases of a past 
era.”31 The findings of the Article are not conclusive, but that is 
not surprising given the complexity of the torts system and the 
available (and unavailable) data. The lack of definitiveness, 
however, does not eviscerate the Article’s significance.  
III. Why This Matters So Much 
The Article is important for several reasons outlined here. 
The policy reasons for changing torts doctrines as the authors 
advocate have been thoroughly explored elsewhere; this Article 
adds an essential dimension to the debates about reforming tort 
doctrines.  
                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 622–23. 
 28. Id. at 628.  
 29. Id. at 623.  
 30. Id. at 621. 
 31. Id. at 631. 
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A. Exclusion of Urban African-American Jurors.  
One focus of the Article is on the exclusion of urban African-
American jurors from hearing tort cases. The Article aims to 
show how the retention of antiquated torts doctrines, particularly 
in southern states, prevents plaintiffs from getting to juries, 
resulting in predominately poor African-American juries being 
not allowed to decide plaintiffs’ cases.  
Exclusion of urban African-American jurors from hearing 
tort cases is wrong in many ways. The torts system is part of our 
legal system and jury participation in civil or criminal cases is an 
important aspect of civic engagement and citizenship. Exclusion 
of any group from participation in that responsibility is 
illegitimate in and of itself. Exclusion from jury service in tort 
cases on the basis of race violates potential jurors’ equal 
protection rights.32 As the Supreme Court wrote in Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete,33 “to permit racial exclusion in this official 
forum compounds the racial insult in judging a person by the 
color of his or her skin.”34 Second, exclusion of any group from 
that responsibility is harmful and stigmatizing to the group, 
suggesting their contributions are worthless.35 Third, denying the 
opportunity to serve on a jury to members of the group is 
damaging and insulting to each individual member of the group, 
reflecting a view that his or her contributions are valueless. The 
Edmonson court wrote that “racial discrimination in the quality 
or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons.”36 Exclusion 
of a group and its members from making jury determinations is 
harmful to society as a whole. If we believe in juries as a way of 
resolving civil disputes (granted this is a contested way of 
resolving civil disputes), we must believe that the quality of 
decisionmaking will be degraded by excluding African-Americans.  
                                                                                                     
 32.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991) 
(noting “that a prosecutor’s race-based peremptory challenge violates the equal 
protection rights of those excluded from jury service”).  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 620.  
 35.  Id. at 628 (“To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds 
the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin.”). 
 36.  Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)).  
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B. Exclusion Leading to Undercompensation of African-American 
Plaintiffs.  
Tort law and adjudication embody an inherent tension 
between the principles of equality (in this context, that like cases 
should be treated alike) and of individualized adjudication (the 
idea that cases should be decided in an individualized, 
decentralized way by decisionmakers who are not constrained by 
a requirement of uniform treatment). I have discussed this 
tension at length in the context of race, racism, and torts.37 As 
noted above, one possible consequence of continuing past jury-
access-denying doctrines in geographic areas with high 
concentrations of poor African-Americans is that the race-based 
discount applied to African-Americans’ tort claims will continue 
(since in those areas a high concentration of plaintiffs will be 
African-American and their tort claims will be subject to jury-
access-denying doctrines).38  
Part of the subtext here and elsewhere is that injuries to 
members of this group do not “count” for as much as injuries to 
members of other groups, as my historical analysis of tort law 
and damage awards has shown.39 This is another reason why the 
Article’s inquiry is important. Even though there is no consensus 
in torts scholarship as to what the “correct” level of compensation 
for injuries should be, there must be consensus that like cases 
should be treated alike and that tort claims brought by African-
Americans should not be undervalued relative to others’ tort 
claims on the basis of race. The race-based discount applied to 
claims brought by poor, African-American plaintiffs, effectuated 
in part by the continuation of jury-access-denying doctrines, is a 
violation of basic equality and equal protection principles. While 
in the past some appellate judges in determining wrongful death 
damages actually grouped cases involving white decedents in 
different categories from cases involving black decedents, as if the 
                                                                                                     
 37.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2 (citing sources discussing these 
issues).  
 38. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 2, at 52–62 (discussing cases 
where African-American plaintiffs’ claims had been dismissed).  
 39.  See sources cited supra note 2 (discussing why African-American 
plaintiffs are often awarded less damages than other plaintiffs).  
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injury was different in kind because of the decedents’ race,40 that 
and other race-based devaluation should be long gone. Reflecting 
a newer understanding, some courts recently have found that 
making damage determinations based on race-based earnings or 
life expectancy tables violates equality and equal protection 
principles.41 
Devaluing claims brought by poor African-Americans has 
additional negative consequences. First, an inordinately low 
damage award denies victims and their families the possibility of 
a foundation for future financial stability, which has ripple effects 
for generations to come.42 Second, the devaluation cannot help 
but have negative psychic consequences for the individuals 
involved and the group more broadly, contributing to 
demoralization and justifiable anger. Third, if members of a 
group are undercompensated, defendants determining the 
appropriate level of precautions can be expected to adjust down 
the level of precautions taken to prevent harm to residents in 
poor and African-American neighborhoods, applying Learned 
Hand’s formula and other cost-benefit analysis. Last, whites 
benefit in a corrupt and corrupting way from the devaluation of 
injuries to poor, African-American people.  
IV. Conclusion  
Gifford and Jones’ Article deserves a significant place in 
contemporary torts scholarship. The creation of the JADI index is 
a notable contribution and likely to be useful beyond this Article. 
Publishing the JADI index for all fifty states would be very 
                                                                                                     
 40.  See Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 124–25 (“[T]o these 
courts, the principle of treating like cases alike meant comparing deaths of black 
people only with the deaths of other black people. Deaths of white people, 
because they were excluded from the analysis, seem to have been considered 
another kind of harm.”).  
 41.  See cases cited supra note 9 (citing cases where the courts have made 
this determination).  
 42.  See Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3, at 61 
(noting that “the cumulative effect of even small differences in damage remedies 
may be great over time”); Wriggins, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 270 
n.36 (“A $2,500 award in 1909 might have enabled [an African-American 
plaintiff’s] family to buy a house, pay for education, or take other steps that 
might build wealth for future generations.”).  
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interesting. There are additional paths for future inquiry to 
explore with the JADI index. One possible path is suggested in 
the question mentioned in the text about the role of the idea of 
individual responsibility in retention of certain tort doctrines.43 It 
would be instructive to know if this idea relates to the JADI in all 
states, including predominately rural, white states. Do some 
rural, white states evince a powerful and widespread idea of 
individual responsibility that contributes to retention of certain 
doctrines? Also, where do other southern states fall in the JADI 
index—for example, Louisiana? Louisiana may be an outlier since 
it has had a different role for juries due to its justice system 
having originated with French law rather than English law.44 
Given my research on Louisiana’s tort history and race, I wonder 
whether Louisiana has a lower JADI than other southern 
states.45 Also, Louisiana’s damage doctrines are different from 
those of common law states. Could damage doctrines (and 
damage caps) in different states be used to create other JADI 
indices that would also be illuminating? As race and racism are 
important parts of the torts system, mainstream contemporary 
torts scholarship should, as this Article does, recognize and 
grapple with their importance. The Article also deserves a place 
in critical race scholarship, which has not focused much on torts. 
As this Article looks at race and law in new and ground-breaking 
ways, delving far beneath and “beyond” the surface of legal 
doctrine, it is a critical race theory project. Moreover, it goes 
beyond stated formal equality and nondiscrimination principles 
to interrogate actual inequality on the ground. The Article also 
merits a place in empirical legal scholarship generally. It 
rigorously uses a mix of legal doctrine, qualitative analysis, and 
quantitative analysis, to shed genuine light on ways the legal 
system works. The way the authors combined their analytical 
                                                                                                     
 43.  See Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 600 n.202 (discussing the role of 
individual responsibility in southern Protestant culture).  
 44. See William E. Crawford, Life on a Federal Island in a Civilian Sea, 15 
MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (explaining that Louisiana appellate courts have the 
authority to make their own findings of damages as long as there is record 
evidence to support them, can find a civil defendant guilty when a jury had 
exonerated the defendant, and can reverse jury findings on the facts and make a 
contrary decision).  
 45.  For a discussion of torts and race in Louisiana Law at length, see 
Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 99.  
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methods is deft and perhaps could be replicated with other 
questions.  
The authors note that they have found strong correlations 
but not definitive causation, which would be impossible to prove, 
particularly where their hypothesis involved so many different 
actors over a wide geographic area and a decades-long time 
period.46 The torts system is complex. For example, even in the 
height of the Jim Crow era in the Deep South, some black 
plaintiffs won tort cases heard by all-white juries and all-white 
judges.47 Further, as Professor Dayna Bowen Mathew has stated, 
“Americans now seldom espouse the overt racism, prejudice and 
bigotry that our laws prohibit.”48 Leaving aside the challenges of 
finding motive, the finding of a statistically significant correlation 
between a high JADI index and cities with large African-
American populations is powerful. At a minimum, this finding 
creates a disparate impact on black juries (and I argue black 
plaintiffs as well). In and of itself, and coupled with other 
analytical work recommending reform of doctrines such as 
contributory negligence, this disparity should be a catalyst for 
reform.  
Research from the past several decades tells us that implicit 
bias gives a powerful way of thinking about the Article’s 
findings.49 Implicit bias may be at work in most of the decisions to 
retain old tort doctrines made by judges and/or legislatures in the 
southern or northern states that retain some of these doctrines. 
But drawing tight conclusions as to causation is impossible.50 As 
Professor Mathew has recently shown in her excellent recent 
book,51 implicit bias research can usefully shed light on patterns 
of discrimination in decentralized, multi-actor decisions when 
                                                                                                     
 46.  Recall that their hypothesis refers to decisions of “judges and state 
legislators” generally. Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 562.  
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explicit intent is not on the surface. The context she writes about 
is the U.S. health care system but many of her insights may 
apply here as well. The absence of tight, definitive “proof” of 
causation should not be fatal to the authors’ calls for reforms. As 
long as we have a jury system for civil cases, there is no excuse 
for keeping cases from black juries.  
